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The International Health Regulations 10 years on: 
the governing framework for global health security
Lawrence O Gostin, Mary C DeBartolo, Eric A Friedman
Fundamental revisions to the International Health 
Regulations in 2005 were meant to herald a new era of 
global health security and cooperation. Yet, 10 years later, 
the International Health Regulations face criticism, 
particularly after the west African Ebola epidemic. 
Several high-level panels1 are reviewing the International 
Health Regulations’ functions and urging reforms.2 The 
Global Health Security Agenda, a multilateral partnership 
focused on preventing, detecting, and responding to 
natural, accidental, or intentional disease outbreaks, has 
similar capacity building aims, but operates largely 
outside the International Health Regulations.3,4 Here, we 
review the International Health Regulations’ performance 
and future.
The International Health Regulations5 is a legally 
binding instrument, which came into force in June, 2007, 
and now has 196 States Parties—every WHO member 
state plus Lichtenstein and the Holy See.6 The scope of 
the International Health Regulations is “to prevent, 
protect against, control and provide a public health 
response to the international spread of disease” (article 2). 
The scope embraces an all-hazards strategy, covering 
health threats irrespective of their origin or source 
(article 1), which is distinct from the disease-speciﬁ c 
model used in previous versions of the International 
Health Regulations. The intention was to incorporate 
biological, chemical, and radionuclear events.
The International Health Regulations requires States 
Parties to develop core capacities for rapid detection 
and response, including for surveillance, laboratories, 
and risk communication—buttressed by legislation, 
ﬁ nancing, and national focal points. Core capacities 
embrace a public health strategy of strengthening local 
infrastructure and systems to detect, prevent, and contain 
outbreaks at their source before spreading internationally. 
States Parties agreed to “collaborate with each other” to 
develop and maintain core capacities.
Furthermore, States Parties must promptly notify 
WHO of events that might constitute a public health 
emergency of international concern, with a continuing 
obligation to inform WHO of any updates. To guide 
notiﬁ cations, annex 2 of the International Health 
Regulations contains a “decision instrument” to aid in 
assessing whether to notify WHO of a health event of 
potential international concern. Certain threats, such as 
smallpox, always require notiﬁ cation. For other threats, 
States Parties must use the instrument to establish 
whether they need to notify WHO. Departing from 
previous versions, the International Health Regulations 
authorises WHO to consider unoﬃ  cial sources, such as 
scientists and the media. When it receives an unoﬃ  cial 
report, WHO seeks veriﬁ cation from States Parties in 
whose territory the event occurs.
The declaration of a public health emergency of 
international concern is the crucial governance activity of 
the International Health Regulations. The Director-General 
has sole power to declare and to terminate a public health 
emergency of international concern but must consider 
information provided by a State Party; the decision 
instrument; Emergency Committee advice; scientiﬁ c 
principles and evidence; and a risk assessment of human 
health, international spread, and interference with 
international traﬃ  c. If the Director-General declares a 
public health emergency of international concern, she 
must issue temporary, non-binding recommendations 
describing health measures that States Parties should take.
Since 2007, the Director-General has declared three 
public health emergencies of international concern. During 
the 2009 H1N1 inﬂ uenza pandemic, WHO declared the 
ﬁ rst ever public health emergency of international concern 
but was criticised for fuelling public fear. State Parties 
widely disregarded WHO’s temporary recommendations;7,8 
however, in 2011, the Review Committee on International 
Health Regulations functioning during the H1N1 inﬂ uence 
pandemic cautioned, “The world is ill-prepared to respond 
to a severe inﬂ uenza pandemic.”9
In 2014, the Director-General declared two further 
public health emergencies of international concern, for 
polio and for Ebola. The designation of polio seemed 
counterintuitive because only a handful of cases had 
been diagnosed compared with previous years. Yet, small 
pockets of polio in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria 
were putting global eradication at risk. In the case of 
Ebola, the Director-General waited 4 months after 
Médecins Sans Frontières announced an “unprecedented 
outbreak” to declare a public health emergency of 
international concern on Aug 8, 2014.10 WHO’s Ebola 
Interim Assessment Panel in July, 2015, said urgent 
warnings “either did not reach senior leaders or senior 
leaders did not recognise their signiﬁ cance.”11
Several health emergency events have not resulted in a 
declaration of a public health emergency of international 
concern. Currently, the world is watching outbreaks of 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, which has not 
triggered a public health emergency of international 
concern declaration despite reaching more than 
26 countries and causing 575 deaths by November, 
2015.12,13 The Emergency Committee advised that, without 
sustained community transmission, the conditions for a 
public health emergency of international concern have 
not been met.14 The Director-General did not even 
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as cholera in Haiti, the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 
Japan, and the use of chemical weapons in Syria.
Reforming the International Health Regulations
Towards a well functioning global detection and 
response system
Despite shortcomings, the International Health Reg-
ulations is an important governing framework. Yet, a 
crisis of conﬁ dence in the Regulations exists, with the 
Review Committee on International Health Regulations 
functioning during Ebola currently deliberating.15 We 
propose a series of operational and legal reforms. 
Operational reforms are often preferable. Amendments 
to the text of the International Health Regulations require 
World Health Assembly approval, do not enter into 
force immediately, and must be operationalised to be 
successful. Furthermore, reopening the full text could 
entail a multiyear negotiating process, which risks 
weakening the International Health Regulations’ norms 
and protection of human rights. Even for our proposed 
legal reforms, we suggest ways to achieve them by textual 
interpretation and annex amendments in an attempt to 
avoid renegotiating the main text of the International 
Health Regulations.
As shown in the ﬁ gure, although none of the 
following proposed reforms is a solution on its own, 
collectively they could help to build a well functioning 
global detection and response system. Some proposals 
will be easier to achieve than others, although all are 
needed reforms.
National core capacities
Achievement of core capacities by all States Parties 
remains an indisputable baseline for preparedness. The 
initial deadline to meet the International Health 
Regulations’ core capacities was 2012, but WHO 
extended the deadline to 2016 for 81 States Parties. Only 
64 States Parties have aﬃ  rmed meeting core capacities.16 
A well funded, prioritised, and comprehensive global 
plan is now past due. The November, 2014, International 
Health Regulations Review Committee oﬀ ered a sound 
roadmap: strengthen self-assessment; test capacities 
through simulations; promote regional and cross-
regional learning; and measure performance through 
peer review and external assessments.16 Such capacity 
building must go hand-in-hand with universal health 
coverage, a major target in the Sustainable Development 
Goals. The following three recommendations could 
Figure: Strengthening the International Health Regulations (2005)
Establish independent peer-
review core capacity 
evaluation system with 
feedback loop for continuous 
quality improvement
Coordinate the International
Health Regulations (2005) 






to incorporate a One-Health 
Agenda into the International
Health Regulations (2005)
Help with unoﬃcial event 
reporting of potential public 
health emergencies of 
international concern
Develop publicly accessible 
online training platforms to 
assist in use of annex 2 
decision instrument Develop a gradient for public 
health emergency of 
international concern 
declaration
Require states to automatically 
notify WHO of additional
diseases that could become a 
public health emergency of 
international concern
Further increase transparency 
of Emergency Committee
deliberations and ﬁndings
The Director-General should 
publicly request reconsideration 
of unnecessary additional 
measures including travel and 
trade restrictions
Pursue dispute mediation 
for economic losses incurred 
by use of additional measures
including travel and trade 
restrictions
Create sustainable funding 
mechanism to build, 
strengthen, and maintain 
core capacities
















www.thelancet.com   Published online November 22, 2015   http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(15)00948-4 3
advance the International Health Regulations’ aspiration 
for compre hensive preparedness in every country:
First, an “International Health Regulations Capacity 
Fund” should be established. The International Health 
Regulations (article 44) require State Parties to mobilise 
ﬁ nancial resources to build, strengthen, and maintain 
core capacities. The World Health Assembly should 
create an “International Health Regulations Capacity 
Fund,” refreshed every 2 years through increased 
assessed dues—a logical funding source in view of the 
fact that core capacities and international cooperation are 
legally binding requirements of the International Health 
Regulations and WHO oversees the International Health 
Regulations. Voluntary ﬁ nancing is unpredictable, 
encourages earmarked contributions, and wanes in 
intercrisis periods. To ensure States Parties live up to 
their responsibilities, the World Health Assembly could 
establish domestic co-ﬁ nancing expectations as a 
baseline for accessing Capacity Fund resources.
Increasing assessed dues, although important 
to WHO’s future, is politically fraught. Alternative 
ﬁ nancing mechanisms could include the Global Health 
Security Agenda, the World Bank’s proposed Pandemic 
Emergency Financing Facility, or a donors’ conference.1,17,18 
Irrespective of the funding mechanism, ensuring 
sustainable resources would strengthen security for all.
Second, WHO should establish an independent 
peer-review core capacity evaluation system, with a 
feedback loop for continuous quality improvement. 
More rigorous evaluation of core capacities need to be 
undertaken. WHO allows States Parties to self-assess 
their capacities, with many not reporting whether they 
have met their obligation to develop core capacities. 
States often resist external assessment because of 
sovereignty concerns, but the new system would aim to 
foster cooperation. Domestic and external experts 
would work constructively with governments to 
identify capacity gaps, develop a jointly funded 
roadmap, and identify measurable benchmarks for 
success. If evaluations consistently led to technical and 
ﬁ nancial assistance, States Parties would be more 
likely to cooperate.
Third, civil society participation in reviewing core 
capacities should be enhanced. States Parties’ reports 
and WHO evaluations should be open to public scrutiny 
to increase transparency. As with other spheres of 
international law, such as human rights and climate 
change, civil society could oﬀ er “shadow” reports to 
States Parties’ reports and WHO evaluations and 
advocate for full funding of national capacities and 
fulﬁ lling international obligations.
International Health Regulations Emergency 
Committees: transparent and independent
After facing criticism for disclosing the names of 
Emergency Committee members only after the H1N1 
public health emergency of international concern was 
terminated, WHO improved public trust by releasing 
member names for all subsequent Emergency and 
Review Committees.19 WHO also pledged transparency 
about conﬂ icts of interest.20 Concerns persist, however, 
that Emergency Committees are inﬂ uenced by politics 
rather than strictly reviewing scientiﬁ c evidence. To 
increase transparency, WHO could publish full meeting 
minutes, provide web access to documents, and oﬀ er live 
updates through social media platforms.
Transparent Emergency Committee deliberations 
showing independence would build public trust, but 
reforms are of little value if the Director-General does not 
convene an Emergency Committee. Outside WHO’s 
governing structure and drawing on civil society, an 
expert independent committee could convene to review 
data for disease outbreaks and recommend actions to the 
Director-General.
Reporting and surveillance: the decision instrument 
(annex 2)
The World Health Assembly could amend the decision 
instrument to reduce States Parties’ reporting discretion, 
avoiding delayed notiﬁ cation or veriﬁ cation. Presently, 
four diseases automatically require notiﬁ cation. Annex 2 
of the International Health Regulations could be 
modiﬁ ed to require that additional listed diseases become 
automatically reportable. Limiting States Parties’ 
discretion could simplify decision making and reinforce 
the norm of early notiﬁ cation. Routine notiﬁ cations, 
moreover, would reduce the risk of under-reporting. 
Guinean oﬃ  cials, for example, initially downplayed the 
risk, reporting only conﬁ rmed Ebola cases.21 Procedurally, 
the World Health Assembly could update annex 2 of the 
International Health Regulations as it did with annex 7 
regarding yellow fever vaccination.22
The Ebola Interim Assessment Panel said there 
was unawareness or incomplete understanding of 
International Health Regulations requirements at many 
levels.14 WHO could assist States Parties in using the 
decision instrument by making International Health 
Regulations training publicly accessible through online 
platforms. The Health Security Learning Platform is a 
promising start, but is hard to ﬁ nd on WHO’s website; 
tutorials should be accessible without needing registration.
Furthermore, WHO should publicly acknowledge 
information received from non-governmental sources, 
and help with unoﬃ  cial reporting. For example, to help 
gather real-time intelligence, WHO could develop web, 
phone, and tablet applications to report to WHO’s 
Strategic Health Operations Centre.23 Even if a State 
Party does not corroborate an unoﬃ  cial source, WHO 
should undertake its own analysis, sharing information 
transparently to the fullest extent possible in accordance 
with article 11 of the International Health Regulations. 
The new web portal that WHO is developing for 
information sharing and transparency may assist in 
implementing this recommendation.24 
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Public health emergencies of international concern
A public health emergency of international concern 
declaration is the public face of WHO’s outbreak 
response, but WHO has several instruments supporting 
earlier action. In view of the public symbolism of a public 
health emergency of international concern declaration, 
we believe that these emergency response frameworks 
must be integrated with International Health Regulations’ 
processes. For example, WHO uses the Emergency 
Respons e Frame work to inform the international 
community of an outbreak’s severity in a graduated 
manner.24 WHO’s use of two distinct frameworks (the 
Emergency Response Framework and the International 
Health Regulations) resulted in confusion during 
the Ebola outbreak. Similar confusion arose during the 
H1N1 outbreak, when WHO did not coordinate the 
six pandemic phases of the Pandemic Inﬂ uenza 
Preparedness and Response Framework25 (since revised) 
with the International Health Regulations.
The WHO Ebola Interim Assessment Panel 
recommended an intermediate level emergency.26 A 
gradient system would not necessarily require amending 
the International Health Regulations. Rather, WHO 
could develop informal guidelines through article 11. 
Alternatively, the World Health Assembly could 
formulate a new annex in the International Health 
Regulations to illustrate the risk gradient. Diﬀ erent 
grades must also trigger clear operational and ﬁ nancial 
responses. For example, an intermediate-level emergency 
could release resources from WHO’s new emergency 
response contingency fund. A public health emergency 
of international concern declaration, however, would still 
be needed to raise the global alert, stiﬀ en political resolve, 
and mobilise further resources.
Travel and trade restrictions: temporary 
recommendations and additional measures
State and private industry disregard for WHO temporary 
recommendations—particularly travel and trade restrictions 
and injudicious quarantines—undermine the International 
Health Regulations. Temporary recom mendations for 
Ebola did not succeed on two fronts: the Ebola-aﬀ ected 
countries’ health systems did not have the resources to 
implement WHO temporary recommendations; and States 
Parties, because of domestic political pressure, disregarded 
temporary recommendations and did not discourage 
private disruptions of travel and trade, such as airlines 
cancelling ﬂ ights. Governments imposed additional 
measures, impeding deployment of health workers and 
medical supplies to the aﬀ ected region.
To enhance compliance, WHO should publicly request 
States Parties to justify additional measures and urge 
businesses to reconsider restrictions. WHO should 
publicly acknowledge States Parties and businesses that 
comply with temporary recommendations, while publicly 
naming those that impose unnecessary travel and trade 
restrictions.
States Parties should consider pursuing dispute 
mediation through the Director-General or compulsory 
arbitration (article 56 of the International Health 
Regulations). Successful cases by States Parties harmed 
by travel or trade restrictions or human rights violations 
would be a powerful precedent to enhance compliance. 
Lastly, the World Health Assembly could amend the 
International Health Regulations to increase temporary 
recommendations to a binding status. Even if temporary 
recommendations remain non-binding, trade restrictions 
could be challenged through the World Trade 
Organization, as Mexico did during the H1N1 pandemic.
Broadening the International Health Regulations: 
toward “One-Health”
The Inter national Health Regulations (article 14) requires 
WHO to cooperate and coordinate its activities with 
intergovernmental bodies, including entering into formal 
agreements. These agreements could focus on one-health 
strategies, approaches based in the connections between 
human, animal, and environmental health. Cooperative 
arrangements can help one-health strategies, such as 
reducing antibiotic use in animals and misuse in 
humans; monitoring and preventing zoological 
infections; ensuring secure handling of hazardous 
materials; and facilitating vaccine research. Furthermore, 
equitable sharing of the beneﬁ ts and burdens of scientiﬁ c 
technology is crucial. The World Health Assembly 
should expand the Pandemic Inﬂ uenza Preparedness 
Framework during its upcoming review of the Framework 
and integrate it with the International Health Regulations.
The way forward
10 years after its adoption, the time has come to realise 
the International Health Regulations’ promise. The 
unconscionable Ebola epidemic opened a window of 
opportunity for fundamental reform—both for the 
International Health Regulations and the organisation 
that oversees the treaty. That political window, however, 
is rapidly closing. Donor fatigue, fading memories, and 
competing priorities are diverting political attention. 
Empowering WHO and realising the International 
Health Regulations’ potential would shore up global 
health security—an important investment in human and 
animal health, while reducing the vast economic 
consequences of the next global health emergency.
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